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Abstract
A mathematical analysis of the distribution of voting power in the Coun-
cil of the European Union operating according to the Treaty of Lisbon is pre-
sented. We study the effects of Brexit on the voting power of the remaining
members, measured by the Penrose–Banzhaf Index. We note that the effects
in question are non-monotonic with respect to voting weights, in fact, some
member states will lose power after Brexit. We use the normal approxima-
tion of the Penrose–Banzhaf Index in double-majority games to show that
such non-monotonicity is in most cases inherent in the double-majority sys-
tem, but is strongly exacerbated by the peculiarities of the EU population
vector. Furthermore, we investigate consequences of a hypothetical ”gen-
eralized Brexit”, i.e., NN-exit of another member state (from a 28-member
Union), noting that the effects on voting power are non-monotonic in most
cases, but strongly depend on the size of the country leaving the Union.
1 Introduction
The voting rules for the Council of the European Union are based on the Treaty of
Lisbon. A decision of the Council about a proposal of the Commission requires
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a ‘double majority’: A proposal is approved if 55% of the member states support
it which also represent 65% of the Union’s population. Formally speaking, this is
a union of two weighted voting systems. In the first subsystem every country has
weight 1 and the relative quota is 55% (thus the absolute quota is 16 before and 15
after Brexit). In the second subsystem the weights are given by the population of
the respective country and the relative quota is 65% (for more details see the next
section below). There is also a third voting system involved: A proposal is also
if approved if less than four members object, even if the population criterion is
violated. However, this ‘third rule’ of the ‘double majority’ plays only a marginal
role, as we explain in more detail below (see Subsection 4.1).
Intuitively, it seems to be clear that after Brexit the influence of each state
in the Council (except UK, of course) should grow as the normalized weight in-
creases for both subsystems. It was observed independently in [12], [8], [5], [22],
and [19] that this is not the case. The power as defined by the Banzhaf index
grows indeed for all bigger and medium size states. However, the seven smallest
states lose power through Brexit. While this fact has been noted in earlier works,
we move beyond observation and seek to explain it. First, we analyze how this
effect may be triggered by the double majority principle, by decomposing the two
sources of voting power arising from the two subsystems described below. Sec-
ond, we consider ”generalized Brexits” (N.N.-Exits), i.e., exits of other current
member states, and analyzing the ratio of post-exit to pre-exit voting power for
any remaining country as a function of population. On the basis of such analy-
sis, we distinguish between three patterns of N.N.-Exit effects and discuss how
this effect may result from the relationship between the distribution of population
within the EU and the qualified majority quota.
2 Framework and Tools
Definition 1 A voting system consist of a (finite) set V of voters and a setW ⊂
P(V ) of winning coalitions, satisfying
1. V ∈ W
2. ∅ 6∈ W
3. If A ∈ W and A ⊂ B ⊂ V then B ∈ W
In a weighted voting system with weights wv ≥ 0 for each v ∈ V and quota q
the set of winning coalitions is given by
W = {A ⊂ V |
∑
v∈A
wv ≥ q} (1)
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We set w(A) =
∑
v∈Awv and call the number r =
q
wv
the relative quota.
We denote a weighted voting system with weight wi, i = 1, . . . , N and (abso-
lute) quota q by [q;w1, . . . , wN ].
Definition 2 A voter v is called decisive for a coalition A ⊂ V if either v ∈
A,A ∈ W and A \ {v} 6∈ W or v 6∈ A,A 6∈ W and A ∪ {v} ∈ W . The set of
coalitions for which v is decisive is denoted by D(v).
The Banzhaf Power ψv of a voter v is defined by
ψv :=
#{A | A ∈ D(v)}
2#V
, (2)
where #A is the number of elements in A.
The Banzhaf Index βv [18, 1] is the ‘relative’ Banzhaf Power defined as
βv :=
ψ(v)∑
w∈V ψw
. (3)
Definition 3 The Shapley-Shubik Index counts the number of permutations for
which v is decisive. A permutation of a (finite) set V is an ordering of the ele-
ments of V . If V has N elements and pi = v1, v2, . . . , vN is a permutation of V
then the voter vk is called decisive (or pivotal) for pi if {v1, . . . , vk} ∈ W , but
{v1, . . . , vk−1} 6∈ W . We denote the set of all permutations of V by S(V ) and the
set of permutations for which v is decisive by Sv(V ).
The Shapley-Shubik Index S(v) of a voter v is defined by
S(v) =
#Sv(V )
#S(V ) (4)
Both the Shapley-Shubik Index and the Banzhaf Index measure the power of
voters in a voting system. Their difference lies in the assumed collective behavior
of the voters (see e. g. [13]).
3 Theoretical models of exit effects
3.1 General considerations
In this paper we investigate how the power structure is changed if a voter leaves
the voting system. Given a voting system (V,W) and a voter v0 ∈ V who leaves
the system we have to determine the voting rules for the set V ′ = V \ {v0} of
remaining voters.
For a weighted voting system it is natural to keep the weights for the remaining
voters. It is perhaps less obvious what to do with the quota.
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Suppose we start with a weighted voting system V = [q, w1, . . . , wN ] from
which voter N defects then the voting system is V ′ = [q′, w1, . . . , wN−1].
There seem to be three reasonable ways to determine the new quota: The first
is to fix the relative quota, another way is to fix the absolute quota, yet another to
fix the difference between the total weights and the quota.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4 Suppose V = [q, w1, . . . , wN ] is a weighted voting system and set
W = wv and W ′ = wv − wN .
We define the following weighted voting systems for the set V ′ = {v1, . . . , vN−1}
of voters
1. The weighted voting system V˜ with fixed relative quota
V˜ = [q˜, w1, . . . , wN−1] with q˜ = W
′
W
q (5)
2. The weighted voting system V with fixed absolute quota
V = [q, w1, . . . , wN−1] with q = q (6)
provided q < W ′.
3. The weighted voting system V with fixed difference to the total weight
V = [q, w1, . . . , wN−1] with q = q − (W −W ′) (7)
provided q > W −W ′.
Intuitively, one is tempted to expect that if one voter leaves the voting system,
the power of each other voter should increase. However, this is not the case, in
general.
For example in the weighted voting system V = [3; 3, 1, 1, 1] each voter has
positive power, for example the voters with weight 1 have β(v) = 1
10
and S(v) =
1
12
. If the last player defects, the other small players become completely powerless
regardless of which of the quotas in Definition 4 is used.
If a weighted voting system with N voters is simple. i. e. if all weights are
equal, then both the Banzhaf- and the Shapley-Shubik-Index equal 1
N
, so they are
increasing if voters leave the system.
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3.2 Jagiellonian compromise
On the basis of Penrose’s work [18] several authors (e. g. [9], [11], [21]) suggested
that the weights or rather the power indices of the countries in the Council should
be proportional to the square root of the population of the respective country. Such
an idea was applied in the voting system known as the Jagiellonian Compromise
[21], which gives every member state a voting weight proportional to the square
root of its population Pi and sets the quota to
q =
1
2
(
1 +
√∑N
i=1 Pi∑N
i=1
√
Pi
)
. (8)
This threshold minimizes the distance between the Banzhaf indices of all member
states and their respective voting weights.
4 Lisbon treaty and the Brexit
4.1 Voting in the Council
The treaty of Lisbon stipulates a complex voting system for the Council of the
EU. A proposal of the Commission is approved by the Council if:
Either at least q1 := 55% of the member states support the proposal and they
represent at least q2 := 65% of the Union’s population or all but at most 3 vote
‘yea’.
If we denote by P1, P2, . . . , PN the population of N member states and P =∑
Pi the population of the Union, then the voting system in the Council is a
combination of the following weighted voting systems
V1N = [65 · P ;P1, . . . , PN ] (9)
V2N = [55 ·N ; 1, 1, . . . , 1] (10)
and V3N = [N − 3; 1, 1, . . . , 1] (11)
The voting system for the Council is given by
VN =
(
V1N ∩ V2N
)
∪ V3N (12)
Recall that a coalition C in U ∩W (resp. in U ∪W) is winning if C is winning
in U and inW (resp. winning in U or inW).
The voting system V28 (the system with the 28 member states as of 2018) is
not a weighted system. As any voting system it can be obtained as an intersection
of D weighted voting systems for some D (see e. g. [23]). The smallest such D
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is called the dimension of the voting system. The dimension of VEU is at least 7
[14].
The voting systems V1N and V2N are systems with fixed relative quota as defined
in Definition 4, while V3N is a system with fixed difference to the total weight. The
total system is therefore a ‘hybrid’ system with respect to defection.
It is certainly a rather complicated voting system and we will see that it shows
some rather unexpected results.
For practical purposes, however, this system can be somewhat simplified, as
the effect of the third voting subsystem can be considered negligible. Under the
current distribution of weights in the EU, there are 26472389 quasi-minimal win-
ning coalitions (i.e., coalitions with at least one pivotal voter) in the V128 ∩ V228
voting system. Out of all coalitions winning under V328, none can be losing under
V228, and only 10 are losing under V128, so the union of V128 ∩ V228 with V328 only
changes the status of those 10 coalitions. The effect omitting V328 is ‘biggest’ for
the smallest state, Malta. Even for Malta the omission of V328 changes the vot-
ing power by about 2.51 · 10−6. We will denote the pure double-majority system
V128 ∩ V228 as V∗28.
In the next section we’ll analyze the effect of Brexit on the distribution of
voting power among the remaining member states both under the Lisbon system
and some of its variations and under the Jagiellonian Compromise.
4.2 Brexit
One would expect that after Brexit the voting power of the remaining countries
should increase as the share of votes increases in all three subsystems V1,V2,V3.
The increase in power is obvious for subsystems V2 and V3 since for these
systems the voting weights are equal for all countries. A computation for the
system V1 shows monotonicity as well (see Table 2). This table shows the Banzhaf
Indices for the EU Countries under the weighted voting system V1 before and after
Brexit. The column ‘relative difference’ shows the quantity β
27
i
β28i
− 1, where β27i
is the pre-Brexit voting power and β28i is the post-Brexit voting power. We will
denote β
27
i
β28i
− 1 as ϕi.
In contrast to its subsystems, the total system V shows the remarkable effect
that the eight smallest countries actually lose power (as measured by the Banzhaf
Index) after Brexit (see Table 3 and Fig. 1). We note that the largest countries gain
voting power as expected, but the gain (apart from a small anomaly arising for
Italy, which may be a result of a numerical artifact) decreases monotonically with
the country’s size. From the perspective of voting power, Poland (logwi ≈ −2.59)
appears as the chief beneficiary of Brexit (gaining more than 28% in terms of rel-
ative increase of power). Between Poland and the next-largest country, Romania
6
(logwi ≈ −3.24) an apparent discontinuity appears, and from Romania down-
ward in population size the gains become smaller monotonically, ending with a
loss of more than 4% for Malta. The comparison of the Shapley-Shubik Indices
show a somewhat different picture. The four smallest states again lose power, but
the change in voting power is strictly increasing with the voting weight.
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Figure 1: Effects of Brexit on the voting power: ratio of post-Brexit to pre-Brexit
voting power (measured by normalized Banzhaf indices βi) as a function of pre-
Brexit voting weight wi. Weights are on a logarithmic scale. Largest and smallest
countries have been identified by the first letters of their names.
As we remarked already the system V1 keeps the relative quota fixed. In the
case of Brexit this means that the absolute quota jumps from 16 to 15. If instead
in the system V1 we keep the absolute quota fixed (at q = 16) then the large
countries lose power (see Table 5) and the smaller countries gain power. The
same thing would happen if another country would leave the Union after Brexit
(since absolute quota would remain fixed, as d0.55 ∗ 26e = d0.55 ∗ 27e).
It is interesting to compare these results with the ‘Jagiellonian Compromise’
as voting system. For this system all countries win power after Brexit as one
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should expect (see Table 6. In this case all countries gain power and the gain is
uniform up to small variations.
The case that Scotland might separate from the United Kingdom after Brexit
and join the European Union was considered in the paper [12]. Through Scot-
land’s (hypothetical) joining the Union the bigger states will lose power while the
smaller states win influence (see Table 7).
4.3 Explaining nonmonotonicity: decomposing voter power in
double-majority systems
Under a double-majority system, such as V∗EU , we can introduce additional mea-
sures of voting power that enable us to better understand the effects of both voting
rules on each voter’s power.
Definition 5 A set of coalitions which include voter v (C(v)) can be partitioned
into three sets:
• L(v) – losing coalitions,
• W0(v) – winning coalitions for which v is non-pivotal,
• W1(v) – winning coalitions for which v is pivotal under V1N , but not under
V2EU ,
• W2(v) – winning coalitions for which v is pivotal under V2N , but not under
V1EU ,
• W3(v) – winning coalitions for which v is pivotal under both V1N and V2EU .
We will denote the sum ofW1(v),W2(v), andW3(v) byW(v).
Let us now forgo normalization for a while and just consider how the cardinal-
ities of L(v),W0(v),W1(v),W2(v), andW3(v) change when a member country
x leaves the Union. Let us denote the pre-exit coalitions by the superscript index
28, and post-exit coalitions by the superscript index 27. Finally, let
∆(v) := 2
(
#W271 (v)+#W272 (v)+#W273 (v)
)−(#W281 (v)+#W282 (v)+#W283 (v)).
Note that 1+∆(v)/(b28(v)2#V ) (where the denominator is the pre-exit number
of pivotal coalitions) is the ratio of the post-exit to pre-exit Banzhaf power. As it
differs from the ratio of Banzhaf indices only as to a constant factor (2(#D27)/(#D28),
which equals approximately 1.051632 for Brexit), explaining the differences in
∆(v) among member states appears to be the key step in explaining the Brexit
effects.
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Let c ∈ C28(v), and c′ := c \ x. Let us consider under what conditions post-
exit coalition c′ can be of a different class than pre-exit coalition c. There are fifty
combinations, some of which can be easily shown to be impossible. We analyze
them in detail in Appendix B and summarize those which are possible in Table 1,
noting how each change in coalition status affects pivotality:
x ∈ c #c weight range pivot change
x /∈ c 0− 14 0 1 0 L28 to L27
x ∈ c 0− 15 0 1 0 L28 to L27
x /∈ c 15 0 q2(1− wx) 0 L28 to L27
x /∈ c 15 q2(1− wx) min{ q2(1−wx)+wvq2 } 1 L28 toW273
x /∈ c 15 q2(1− wx) + wv 1 1 L28 toW271
x /∈ c 16− 27 0 q2(1− wx) 0 L28 to L27
x /∈ c 16− 27 q2(1− wx) min{ q2(1−wx)+wvq2 } 1 L28 toW272
x /∈ c 16− 27 q2(1− wx) + wv q2 0 L28 toW270
x /∈ c 16− 27 q2 q2(1− wx) + wv 0 W282,3 toW272
x /∈ c 16− 27 max{ q2(1−wx)+wv
q2
} q2 + wv −1 W282,3 toW270
x /∈ c 16 q2 + wv 1 −1 W281 toW270
x /∈ c 17− 27 q2 + wv 1 0 W280 toW270
x ∈ c 16 0 q2 0 L28 to L27
x ∈ c 16 q2 min{ q2(1−wx)+wxq2+wv } −1 W283 to L27
x ∈ c 16 q2(1− wx) + wx q2 + wv 0 W283 toW273
x ∈ c 16 q2 + wv q2 + (1− q2)wx −1 W281 to L27
x ∈ c 16 max{ q2+(1−q2)wx
q2+wv
} q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv 0 W281 toW273
x ∈ c 16 q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv 1 0 W281 toW271
x ∈ c 17− 28 0 q2 0 L28 to L27
x ∈ c 17− 28 q2 min{ q2+(1−q2)wxq2+wv } −1 W282 to L27
x ∈ c 17− 28 q2 + (1− q2)wx q2 + wv 0 W282 toW272
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x ∈ c 17− 28 q2 + wv q2(1− wx) + wx 0 W280 to L27
x ∈ c 17− 28 max{ q2+(1−q2)wx
q2+wv
} q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv 1 W280 toW272
x ∈ c 17− 28 q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv 1 0 W280 toW270
Table 1: Coalition status changes for country v after country x exits the EU of
28 states and their effect on each coalition’s pivotality (1 means a change from
non-pivotal to pivotal, −1 – from pivotal to non-pivotal, and 0 – no change in
pivotality)
It follows that the change of the Banzhaf Power of voter v after the exit of
voter x can be expressed as:
∆(v)
2n
= ψN (v)− 2ψN−1(v) = (13)
Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
q2(1− wx),min
{q2(1− wx) + wv
q2
})
,
x /∈ c
#c ≥ K − 1
)
(14)
+ Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
q2(1− wx) + wv, 1
)
,
x /∈ c
#c = K − 1
)
(15)
− Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
max
{q2(1− wx) + wv
q2
}
, q2 + wv
)
,
x /∈ c
#c ≥ K
)
(16)
− Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
q2 + wv, 1
)
,
x /∈ c
#c = K
)
(17)
− Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
q2,min
{q2 + (1− q2)wx
q2 + wv
})
,
x ∈ c
#c ≥ K
)
(18)
− Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
q2 + wv, q2 + (1− q2)wx
)
,
x ∈ c
#c = K
)
(19)
+ Pr
(
w(c) ∈
(
max
{q2 + (1− q2)wx
q2 + wv
}
, q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv
)
,
x ∈ c
#c > K
)
,
(20)
where N = 28 and K := dq1Ne = 16. Note again that this formula is only
correct under the assumption that dq1Ne > dq1(N − 1)e.
Starting with Merrill [17], researchers have approximated the distribution of
weights for all coalitions (regardless of size) with µ = 1
2
(1 − wv) and σ2 =
1
4
∑n
i=1w
2
i −w2v (see, e.g., [4, 21]). Drawing upon this idea, we will likewise em-
ploy the normal distribution to approximate the distribution of weight for coali-
tions subject to size constraints.
It is known that a sequences of random variables MN , where MN is the mean
of a sample of size k drawn without replacement from a finite population of size
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N , mean m, and variance s2 converges in distribution to X ∼ N (m,σ), where
σ =
√
1
k
s2
(
1− k
N
)
[2, 6, 20, 7]. In our case, we are sampling k−2 or k−1 coun-
tries (depending on whether the coalition is defined to include country x) from a
population of N − 2 (inclusion of countries x and v is not random). Accordingly,
the distribution of weights for a set Ck,ξ of coalitions c such that #c = k and
1c(x) = ξ can be approximated by the normal distribution with parameters:
µ(k, ξ) = (1− wv − wx)k − 1− ξ
N − 2 + wv + ξwx, (21)
σ2(k, ξ) =
k − 1− ξ
N − 2
(
1− k − 1− ξ
N − 2
)( N∑
i=1
w2i − w2v − w2x −
(
1− wv − wx
N − 2
)2)
,
(22)
while the distribution of weights for a set Ck0,ξ of coalitions c such that #c ≥
k0 and 1c(x) = ξ – by the normal distribution with parameters:
µ+(k0, ξ) =
∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
µ(k, ξ)
(
N−2
k−1−ξ
)∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
(
N−2
k−1−ξ
) = (23)
= (1− wv − wx)
∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
(
N−3
k−2−ξ
)∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
(
N−2
k−1−ξ
) + wv + ξwx = (24)
=
1− wv − wx
N − 2
(
k0 − 1− ξ + Θ(N, k0, ξ)
)
+ wv + ξwx, (25)
where
Θ(N, k0, ξ) :=
(
N−2
k0−ξ
)
2F1
(
2,k0−N−ξ+2
k0−ξ+1 ;−1
)
(
N−2
k0−ξ−1
)
2F1
(
1,k0−N−ξ+1
k0−ξ ;−1
) , (26)
and
σ2+(k, ξ) =
∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
(
σ2(k, ξ) + µ2(k, ξ)
)(
N−2
k−1−ξ
)
∑N−1+ξ
k=k0
(
N−2
k−1−ξ
) − µ2+(k0, ξ). (27)
(27) can be expressed in terms of hypergeometric functions as well, but to avoid
undue verbosity we will leave in the above form.
(13) can now be expressed in terms of the normal c.d.f. (Φ):
∆ˆ(v) = Φ
(
min
{
q2(1−wx)+wv
q2
}
− µ+(K − 1, 0)
σ+(K − 1, 0)
){
N − 2
K − 2
}
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− Φ
(
q2(1− wx)− µ+(K − 1, 0)
σ+(K − 1, 0)
){
N − 2
K − 2
}
+
(
1− Φ
(
q2(1− wx) + wv − µ(K − 1, 0)
σ(K − 1, 0)
))(
N − 2
K − 2
)
−
Φ(q2 + wv − µ+(K, 0)
σ+(K, 0)
)
+ Φ
(
max
{
q2(1−wx)+wv
q2
}
− µ+(K, 0)
σ+(K, 0)
){N − 2
K − 1
}
−
(
1 + Φ
(
q2 + wv − µ(K, 0)
σ(K, 0)
))(
N − 2
K − 1
)
−
Φ(min
{
q2+(1−q2)wx
q2+wv
}
− µ+(K, 1)
σ+(K, 1)
)
+ Φ
(
q2 − µ+(K, 1)
σ+(K, 1)
){N − 2
K − 2
}
−max
(
0,Φ
(
q2 + (1− q2)wx − µ(K, 1)
σ(K, 1)
)
− Φ
(
q2 + wv − µ(K, 1)
σ(K, 1)
))(
N − 2
K − 2
)
+ Φ
(
q2 + (1− q2)wx + wv − µ+(K + 1, 1)
σ+(K + 1, 1)
){
N − 2
K − 1
}
− Φ
(
max
{
q2+(1−q2)wx
q2+wv
}
− µ+(K + 1, 1)
σ+(K + 1, 1)
){
N − 2
K − 1
}
, (28)
where {
n
k
}
:=
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
=
(
n
k
)
2F1
(
1, k − n
k + 1
;−1
)
. (29)
As Fig. 2 demonstrates, the normal approximation works rather well for small
countries (although there is still a small underestimation), but introduces a signif-
icant error for larger countries. The reason has to do with a peculiarity of the EU
weight vector: while the large countries account for more than 70% of the Union’s
population (70.3604%, to be exact), there are only six of them. The distribution
of voting weights can therefore be thought of in terms of a mixture of Gaus-
sians (each of which approximates quite well the distribution of small countries’
weights) centered at several peaks. For six countries, those peaks are numerous
enough (there as many as there are subsets of the set of large countries, i.e., 26,
although since France, UK, and Italy are very close in terms of population, the
number of distinct peaks is actually on the order of 25), as illustrated by Fig. 3 (a),
that this mixture is approximately unimodal, and can therefore by well approx-
imated by a normal distribution. But when a large country exits the Union and
we are estimating ∆v for another large country, the sampling population of large
countries is reduced to 4, the number of distinct peaks decreases exponentially
12
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Figure 2: Difference of post-Brexit and pre-Brexit Banzhaf power (∆v := φ27v −
φ28v ), estimated using normal approximation, as a function of country’s voting
weight (i.e., normalized population). Red points correspond to exact values of ∆v
for current EU member states.
(see Fig. 3 (b)), and the overall mixture distribution is no longer approximately
normal, as demonstrated by Fig. 4 (b). Its multimodality leads to approximation
errors seen on Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 does not reveal the nonmonotonicities observed on Fig. 1. Those only
appear when we divide the change of Banzhaf power by the pre-exit voting power
ψ28(v). This quantity can also be estimated using the normal approximation (so
we can still describe the effects of an exit by an analytical formula, but at the cost
of introducing another source of approximation error):
ψ28(v) ≈ 2−28
(
N − 1
K − 1
)(
1− Φ
(
q2 − µ∗(K)
σ∗(K)
))
+ 2−28
(
N − 1
K
)
2F1
(
1, K + 1−N
K
;−1
)
Φ
(
q2 + wv − µ∗+(K)
σ∗+(K)
)
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Figure 3: Density functions f of the distributions of coalition weights
∑
w for
coalitions sampled only from the population of (a) the top 6 EU countries, and (b)
the top 4 EU countries (obtained through kernel density estimation). Note how
the total variation increases as the size of the population approaches 1.
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Figure 4: Density functions f of the distributions of coalition weights
∑
w for
coalitions consisting of (a) Sweden and Denmark, (b) UK and Poland, and 14
countries sampled out of the remaining member states (black line), plotted against
the density of the approximating normal distribution with parameters given by
(21) and (22) (red line). Quality of the approximation depends on the cardinality
of the number of large countries which can be sampled – six in the first plot, four
in the second plot.
− 2−28
(
N − 1
K
)
2F1
(
1, K + 1−N
K
;−1
)
Φ
(
q2 − µ∗+(K)
σ∗+(K)
)
, (30)
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where
µ∗(k) = (1− wv) k − 1
N − 1 + wv, (31)
(σ∗)2(k) =
k − 1
N − 1
(
1− k − 1
N − 1
)( N∑
i=1
w2i − w2v −
(
1− wv
N − 1
)2)
, (32)
µ∗+(k0) =
1− wv
N − 1
(
k0 − 1 + Θ(N, k0, 0)
)
+ wv, (33)
and
(σ∗+)
2(k, ξ) =
∑N
k=k0
(
(σ∗)2(k) + (µ∗)2(k)
)(
N−1
k−1
)
∑N
k=k0
(
N−1
k−1
) − (µ∗+)2(k0). (34)
Again, the resulting approximation is better for small countries:
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Figure 5: Exact Banzhaf power values of EU member states ψ(i), where i =
1, ..., 28 (black points), and their normal approximations (red points) as a function
of voting weight wi.
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Figure 6: Ratio of post-Brexit and pre-Brexit Banzhaf power values of EU mem-
ber states other than the UK (ψ27i and ψ
27
i , respectively) as a function of voting
weight wi. Black points represent exact values, while red points represent normal
approximations.
Fig. 6 demonstrates that even under the normal approximation, a different
pattern of effects appears for large countries. This suggests that such effects are
inherent in the double majority voting rule. Nevertheless, the apparent discon-
tinuity between Romania and Poland and the nonmonotonicity between Poland,
Spain, and Italy, appear only for exact values. This in turn indicates that they are
caused by the distributional peculiarities of the EU – small number of large states
– that cause the normal approximation to fail in those cases.
4.4 N.N.-exit.
While the difference between Brexit effects for large and small countries has been
noted by [19], their nonmonotonicity appears to have escaped the attention of
earlier researchers. Nor is this effect unique to Brexit: we have analyzed the
change of voting power for each of the current 28 members states in the event of
16
every other country leaving the Union of 28 (N.N.-exit). The detailed data are
available at our home page, but plots for some representative cases (four large and
four small countries) are included below.
−7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
Germany
log wi
β  i27
β  i28
−7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2
0.
95
1.
10
1.
25
France
log wi
β  i27
β  i28
−7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2
1.
00
1.
10
1.
20
Spain
log wi
β  i27
β  i28
−7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2
0.
95
1.
05
1.
15
Poland
log wi
β  i27
β  i28
log wi
β  i27
β  i28
Figure 7: Ratio of post-exit and pre-exit Banzhaf indices of remaining EU member
states in the event of a large country leaving the 28-member EU as a function of
the pre-exit voting weights.
Our calculations reveal three patterns of N.N.-exit effects (change of voting
power as a function of the original voting weight), with sharp difference between
large and small countries:
• When a small country leaves the Union, the change of voting power is in-
creasing and convex for small countries, also increasing but concave for
large countries, and there appears to be a discontinuity between the two sets
of countries;
• When a large country other than Poland leaves the Union, the change of
voting power is non-monotonic but apparently smooth for small countries
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Figure 8: Ratio of post-exit and pre-exit Banzhaf indices of remaining EU member
states in the event of a small country leaving the 28-member EU as a function of
the pre-exit voting weights.
(first increasing and convex, later than increasing and concave, and finally
decreasing and concave), decreasing for large countries, and a discontinu-
ity exists between the large and small countries, with all values for large
countries being above all values for small countries;
• When Poland (the smallest large country) leaves the Union, the change of
voting power is decreasing and concave for small countries, also decreasing
for large countries (with not enough data points to reliably assess convex-
ity), and there is a discontinuity between the two sets of countries, with all
values for large countries being above all values for small countries.
We conjecture that those patterns have not been noted with earlier researchers,
as they have preoccupied primarily with the scenario of another member state
leaving the EU of 27 (post-Brexit). This would be a very different case, as it
would involve no change in the absolute threshold under the first voting rule,
18
since dq127e = 15 = dq126e. But if we assume that two countries leave the
current EU of 27, and analyze the exit of a potential third country, the patterns
discussed above reappear.
At least in part those different patterns can be explained by reference to the
approximation method discussed in the foregoing section. Figs. 9 and 10 illustrate
how the ratio of post-exit and pre-exit Banzhaf power values as a function of pre-
exit voting weights would change depending on the size of the leaving country.
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Figure 9: Estimated ratio of post-exit and pre-exit Banzhaf power values of re-
maining EU member states in the event of a large country leaving the 28-member
EU, obtained through normal approximation of weight distributions, as a function
of the pre-exit voting weights.
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Figure 10: Estimated ratio of post-exit and pre-exit Banzhaf power values of re-
maining EU member states in the event of a small country leaving the 28-member
EU, obtained through normal approximation of weight distributions, as a function
of the pre-exit voting weights.
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6 Appendix A
Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 15.89 % 18.21 % 14.61 %
France 66.35 13.14 % 15.12 % 15.05 %
United Kingdom 64.77 12.83 %
Italy 61.44 12.15 % 13.91 % 14.48 %
Spain 46.44 9.17 % 10.66 % 16.29 %
Poland 38.01 7.01 % 9.15 % 30.63 %
Romania 19.86 3.94 % 4.30 % 9.18 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.39 % 3.73 % 9.92 %
Belgium 11.26 2.22 % 2.46 % 10.66 %
Greece 10.85 2.14 % 2.37 % 10.69 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.06 % 2.28 % 10.71 %
Portugal 10.37 2.05 % 2.27 % 10.71 %
Hungary 9.86 1.95 % 2.16 % 10.75 %
Sweden 9.79 1.93 % 2.14 % 10.75 %
Austria 8.58 1.70 % 1.88 % 10.83 %
Bulgaria 7.20 1.43 % 1.58 % 10.86 %
Denmark 5.65 1.11 % 1.24 % 10.94 %
Finland 5.47 1.08 % 1.20 % 10.94 %
Slovakia 5.40 1.06 % 1.18 % 10.93 %
Ireland 4.63 0.91 % 1.01 % 10.95 %
Croatia 4.23 0.83 % 0.92 % 10.96 %
Lithuania 2.92 0.57 % 0.64 % 11.07 %
Slovenia 2.06 0.41 % 0.46 % 10.94 %
Latvia 1.99 0.39 % 0.43 % 10.94 %
Estonia 1.31 0.26 % 0.29 % 10.88 %
Cyprus 0.85 0.17 % 0.19 % 11.00 %
Luxembourg 0.56 0.11 % 0.12 % 10.92 %
Malta 0.43 0.08 % 0.09 % 10.84 %
Table 2: Banzhaf Indices for V1 before and after Brexit
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 10.19% 11.89% 16.69%
France 66.35 8.45% 9.96% 17.89%
United Kingdom 64.77 8.27%
Italy 61.44 7.91% 9.25% 16.92%
Spain 46.44 6.20% 7.65% 23.52%
Poland 38.01 5.07% 6.54% 28.87%
Romania 19.86 3.78% 4.00% 5.90%
Netherlands 17.16 3.50% 3.70% 5.85%
Belgium 11.26 2.90% 3.01% 4.07%
Greece 10.85 2.86% 2.97% 3.88%
Czech Republic 10.42 2.81% 2.92% 3.69%
Portugal 10.37 2.81% 2.91% 3.67%
Hungary 9.86 2.76% 2.85% 3.41%
Sweden 9.79 2.75% 2.84% 3.36%
Austria 8.58 2.63% 2.70% 2.73%
Bulgaria 7.20 2.49% 2.54% 1.88%
Denmark 5.65 2.33% 2.35% 0.81%
Finland 5.47 2.31% 2.33% 0.69%
Slovakia 5.40 2.30% 2.32% 0.61%
Ireland 4.63 2.22% 2.22% 0.00%
Croatia 4.23 2.18% 2.18% -0.34%
Lithuania 2.92 2.05% 2.02% -1.56%
Slovenia 2.06 1.96% 1.92% -2.40%
Latvia 1.99 1.95% 1.91% -2.51%
Estonia 1.31 1.89% 1.82% -3.26%
Cyprus 0.85 1.84% 1.77% -3.80%
Luxembourg 0.56 1.81% 1.73% -4.19%
Malta 0.43 1.79% 1.71% -4.38%
Table 3: Banzhaf Indices before and after Brexit for the Lisbon system
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Country Population Shapley-Shubik Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 14.38 % 17.27 % 20.09 %
France 66.35 11.22 % 13.26 % 18.15 %
United Kingdom 64.77 10.91 %
Italy 61.44 10.27 % 12.15 % 18.33 %
Spain 46.44 7.51 % 8.99 % 19.69 %
Poland 38.01 6.32 % 6.98 % 10.46 %
Romania 19.86 3.74 % 3.98 % 6.56 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.31 % 3.55 % 7.12 %
Belgium 11.26 2.42 % 2.59 % 7.27 %
Greece 10.85 2.36 % 2.52 % 7.13 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.30 % 2.46 % 7.04 %
Portugal 10.37 2.29 % 2.45 % 7.07 %
Hungary 9.86 2.21 % 2.37 % 6.96 %
Sweden 9.79 2.20 % 2.35 % 6.99 %
Austria 8.58 2.03 % 2.17 % 6.83 %
Bulgaria 7.20 1.83 % 1.94 % 6.08 %
Denmark 5.65 1.61 % 1.68 % 4.60 %
Finland 5.47 1.58 % 1.66 % 4.54 %
Slovakia 5.40 1.57 % 1.64 % 4.47 %
Ireland 4.63 1.46 % 1.51 % 3.61 %
Croatia 4.23 1.41 % 1.45 % 3.14 %
Lithuania 2.92 1.22 % 1.24 % 2.21 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.10 % 1.10 % 0.36 %
Latvia 1.99 1.09 % 1.09 % 0.13 %
Estonia 1.31 0.99 % 0.98 % -1.22 %
Cyprus 0.85 0.93 % 0.91 % -2.11 %
Luxembourg 0.56 0.89 % 0.86 % -2.97 %
Malta 0.43 0.87 % 0.84 % -3.50 %
Table 4: Shapley-Shubik Indices before and after Brexit for the Lisbon system
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 10.19 % 9.92 % -2.67 %
France 66.35 8.45 % 8.39 % -0.61 %
United Kingdom 64.77 8.27 %
Italy 61.44 7.91 % 7.84 % -0.96 %
Spain 46.44 6.20 % 6.67 % 7.70 %
Poland 38.01 5.07 % 5.66 % 11.46 %
Romania 19.86 3.78 % 3.91 % 3.52 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.50 % 3.69 % 5.60 %
Belgium 11.26 2.90 % 3.18 % 9.90 %
Greece 10.85 2.86 % 3.15 % 10.25 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.81 % 3.11 % 10.61 %
Portugal 10.37 2.81 % 3.11 % 10.66 %
Hungary 9.86 2.76 % 3.06 % 11.11 %
Sweden 9.79 2.75 % 3.05 % 11.21 %
Austria 8.58 2.63 % 2.95 % 12.35 %
Bulgaria 7.20 2.49 % 2.83 % 13.79 %
Denmark 5.65 2.33 % 2.69 % 15.69 %
Finland 5.47 2.31 % 2.68 % 15.88 %
Slovakia 5.40 2.30 % 2.67 % 16.01 %
Ireland 4.63 2.22 % 2.60 % 17.03 %
Croatia 4.23 2.18 % 2.57 % 17.60 %
Lithuania 2.92 2.05 % 2.45 % 19.65 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.96 % 2.38 % 21.06 %
Latvia 1.99 1.95 % 2.37 % 21.24 %
Estonia 1.31 1.89 % 2.31 % 22.48 %
Cyprus 0.85 1.84 % 2.27 % 23.40 %
Luxembourg 0.56 1.81 % 2.24 % 24.03 %
Malta 0.43 1.79 % 2.23 % 24.36 %
Table 5: Indices for a modified Lisbon system with quota q = 16 in V227
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 9.10 % 9.89 % 8.75 %
France 66.35 8.24 % 8.97 % 8.87 %
United Kingdom 64.77 8.14 %
Italy 61.44 7.93 % 8.64 % 8.89 %
Spain 46.44 6.90 % 7.52 % 8.91 %
Poland 38.01 6.24 % 6.80 % 8.92 %
Romania 19.86 4.51 % 4.91 % 8.88 %
Netherlands 17.16 4.19 % 4.56 % 8.88 %
Belgium 11.26 3.39 % 3.69 % 8.87 %
Greece 10.855 3.33 % 3.63 % 8.87 %
Czech Republic 10.42 3.26 % 3.55 % 8.87 %
Portugal 10.37 3.26 % 3.55 % 8.87 %
Hungary 9.86 3.17 % 3.46 % 8.87 %
Sweden 9.79 3.16 % 3.44 % 8.87 %
Austria 8.58 2.96 % 3.22 % 8.87 %
Bulgaria 7.20 2.71 % 2.95 % 8.88 %
Denmark 5.65 2.40 % 2.62 % 8.86 %
Finland 5.47 2.36 % 2.57 % 8.85 %
Slovakia 5.40 2.35 % 2.56 % 8.86 %
Ireland 4.63 2.17 % 2.37 % 8.86 %
Croatia 4.23 2.08 % 2.26 % 8.86 %
Lithuania 2.92 1.73 % 1.88 % 8.87 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.45 % 1.58 % 8.86 %
Latvia 1.99 1.42 % 1.55 % 8.86 %
Estonia 1.31 1.16 % 1.26 % 8.85 %
Cyprus 0.85 0.93 % 1.01 % 8.86 %
Luxembourg 0.56 0.76 % 0.82 % 8.85 %
Malta 0.43 0.66 % 0.72 % 8.88 %
Table 6: Indices for the Jagiellonian Compromise
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with UK without UK Difference
Germany 81.09 11.89 % 10.61 % -10.78 %
France 66.35 9.96 % 8.89 % -10.67 %
Scotland 5.34 2.45 %
Italy 61.44 9.25 % 8.27 % -10.59 %
Spain 46.44 7.65 % 6.93 % -9.47 %
Poland 38.01 6.54 % 5.78 % -11.59 %
Romania 19.86 4.00 % 3.87 % -3.36 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.70 % 3.62 % -2.34 %
Belgium 11.26 3.01 % 3.03 % 0.65 %
Greece 10.85 2.97 % 2.99 % 0.92 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.92 % 2.95 % 1.22 %
Portugal 10.37 2.91 % 2.95 % 1.25 %
Hungary 9.86 2.85 % 2.90 % 1.63 %
Sweden 9.79 2.84 % 2.89 % 1.70 %
Austria 8.58 2.70 % 2.77 % 2.64 %
Bulgaria 7.20 2.54 % 2.63 % 3.89 %
Denmark 5.65 2.35 % 2.48 % 5.51 %
Finland 5.47 2.33 % 2.46 % 5.69 %
Slovakia 5.40 2.32 % 2.45 % 5.80 %
Ireland 4.63 2.22 % 2.37 % 6.73 %
Croatia 4.23 2.18 % 2.33 % 7.25 %
Lithuania 2.92 2.02 % 2.20 % 9.13 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.92 % 2.12 % 10.46 %
Latvia 1.99 1.91 % 2.11 % 10.64 %
Estonia 1.31 1.82 % 2.04 % 11.83 %
Cyprus 0.85 1.77 % 1.99 % 12.72 %
Luxembourg 0.56 1.73 % 1.96 % 13.36 %
Malta 0.43 1.71 % 1.95 % 13.68 %
Table 7: Indices for Scotland joining the Union after Brexit
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with Sweden without Sweden Difference
Germany 81.09 10.19 % 11.23 % 10.15 %
France 66.35 8.45 % 9.27 % 9.79 %
United Kingdom 64.77 8.27 % 9.07 % 9.68 %
Italy 61.44 7.91 % 8.66 % 9.44 %
Spain 46.44 6.20 % 6.73 % 8.46 %
Poland 38.01 5.07 % 5.39 % 6.23 %
Romania 19.86 3.78 % 3.93 % 3.80 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.50 % 3.59 % 2.74 %
Belgium 11.26 2.90 % 2.90 % 0.04 %
Greece 10.85 2.86 % 2.85 % -0.19 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.81 % 2.80 % -0.43 %
Portugal 10.37 2.81 % 2.79 % -0.47 %
Hungary 9.86 2.76 % 2.73 % -0.77 %
Sweden 9.79 2.75 %
Austria 8.58 2.63 % 2.58 % -1.59 %
Bulgaria 7.20 2.49 % 2.42 % -2.58 %
Denmark 5.65 2.33 % 2.24 % -3.80 %
Finland 5.47 2.31 % 2.22 % -3.96 %
Slovakia 5.40 2.30 % 2.21 % -4.02 %
Ireland 4.63 2.22 % 2.12 % -4.73 %
Croatia 4.23 2.18 % 2.07 % -5.12 %
Lithuania 2.92 2.05 % 1.92 % -6.46 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.96 % 1.82 % -7.46 %
Latvia 1.99 1.95 % 1.81 % -7.56 %
Estonia 1.31 1.88 % 1.73 % -8.41 %
Cyprus 0.85 1.84 % 1.67 % -9.04 %
Luxembourg 0.56 1.81 % 1.64 % -9.44 %
Malta 0.43 1.79 % 1.62 % -9.64 %
Table 8: Indices if Sweden leaves the EU with 28 members
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Country Population Banzhaf Index (%) Relative
(millions) with Estonia without Estonia Difference
Germany 81.09 10.19 % 11.20 % 9.84 %
France 66.35 8.45 % 9.26 % 9.67 %
United Kingdom 64.77 8.27 % 9.06 % 9.55 %
Italy 61.44 7.91 % 8.65 % 9.27 %
Spain 46.44 6.20 % 6.73 % 8.51 %
Poland 38.01 5.07 % 5.37 % 5.87 %
Romania 19.86 3.78 % 3.89 % 2.73 %
Netherlands 17.16 3.50 % 3.55 % 1.57 %
Belgium 11.26 2.90 % 2.86 % -1.41 %
Greece 10.85 2.86 % 2.81 % -1.68 %
Czech Republic 10.42 2.81 % 2.76 % -1.94 %
Portugal 10.37 2.81 % 2.75 % -1.96 %
Hungary 9.86 2.76 % 2.69 % -2.32 %
Sweden 9.79 2.75 % 2.68 % -2.36 %
Austria 8.58 2.63 % 2.54 % -3.22 %
Bulgaria 7.20 2.49 % 2.38 % -4.31 %
Denmark 5.65 2.33 % 2.20 % -5.69 %
Finland 5.47 2.31 % 2.17 % -5.87 %
Slovakia 5.40 2.30 % 2.17 % -5.93 %
Ireland 4.63 2.22 % 2.07 % -6.72 %
Croatia 4.23 2.18 % 2.03 % -7.16 %
Lithuania 2.92 2.05 % 1.87 % -8.67 %
Slovenia 2.06 1.96 % 1.77 % -9.79 %
Latvia 1.99 1.95 % 1.76 % -9.89 %
Estonia 1.31 1.88 %
Cyprus 0.85 1.84 % 1.62 % -11.56 %
Luxembourg 0.56 1.81 % 1.59 % -12.02 %
Malta 0.43 1.79 % 1.57 % -12.22 %
Table 9: Indices if Estonia leaves the EU with 28 members
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7 Appendix B
x ∈ c pre-exit post-exit conditions
x /∈ c L28(v) L27(v) #c < 15 or w(c) < q2(1− wx)
x /∈ c L28(v) W270 (v) #c > 15 and q2 > w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wv
x /∈ c L28(v) W271 (v) #c = 15 and w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wv
x /∈ c L28(v) W272 (v) #c > 15 and q2(1− wx) + wv > w(c) ≥ q2(1− wx)
x /∈ c L28(v) W272 (v) #c = 15 and q2(1− wx) + wv > w(c) ≥ q2(1− wx)
x ∈ c L28(v) L27(v) #c < 16 or w(c) < q2
x ∈ c L28(v) W27(v) impossible, as #c′ < #c <= 15
x /∈ c W28(v) L27(v) impossible, as #c
′ = #c > 16 and
w(c′)− w(v′) = w(c)−wv
1−wx > w(c)− wv > q2
x /∈ c W
28
0 (v) W270 (v) #c >= 16 > 15 and w(c) > q2 + wvW281 (v)
x /∈ c W28(v) W271 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c >= 16 > 15
x /∈ c W
28
0 (v) W272 (v) impossible, as w(c′)− w(v′) = w(c)−wv1−wx > w(c)− wv > q2W281 (v)
x /∈ c W
28
0 (v) W273 (v) impossible because of the conjunction of the above two reasonsW281 (v)
x /∈ c W
28
2 (v) W270 (v) q2 + wv > w(c) > max{q2(1− wx) + wv, q2}W283 (v)
x /∈ c W
28
2 (v) W271 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c >= 16 > 15W283 (v)
x /∈ c W
28
2 (v) W272 (v) q2(1− wx) + wv > w(c) > q2 > w(c)− wvW283 (v)
x /∈ c W
28
2 (v) W273 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c >= 16 > 15W283 (v)
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x ∈ c W280 (v) L27(v) q2(1− wx) + wx > w(c) > q2 + wv
x ∈ c W280 (v) W270 (v) w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wx + wv
x ∈ c W280 (v) W271 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 > 16, so #c′ > 15
x ∈ c W280 (v) W272 (v) q2(1− wx) + wx + wv > w(c) > max{ q2(1−wx)+wxq2+wv }
x ∈ c W280 (v) W273 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 > 16, so #c′ > 15
x ∈ c W281 (v) L27(v) q2(1− wx) + wx > w(c) > q2 + wv
x ∈ c W281 (v) W270 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 = 15
x ∈ c W281 (v) W271 (v) w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wx + wv
x ∈ c W281 (v) W272 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 = 15
x ∈ c W281 (v) W273 (v) q2(1− wx) + wx + wv > w(c) > max{ q2(1−wx)+wxq2+wv }
x ∈ c W
28
2 (v) L27(v) w(c) < min{q2(1− wx) + wx, q2 + wv}
W283 (v)
x ∈ c W
28
2 (v) W270 (v)
impossible, as w(c)− wv > q2(1− wx) + wx > q2
and w(c)− wv < q2 are contradictoryW283 (v)
x ∈ c W282 (v) W271 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 > 16, so #c′ > 15
x ∈ c W282 (v) W272 (v) q2 + wv > w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wx
x ∈ c W282 (v) W273 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 > 16, so #c′ > 15
x ∈ c W283 (v) W271 (v) impossible, as w(c)− wv > q2(1− wx) + wx > q2
and w(c)− wv < q2 are contradictory
x ∈ c W283 (v) W272 (v) impossible, as #c′ = #c− 1 = 15
x ∈ c W283 (v) W273 (v) q2 + wv > w(c) > q2(1− wx) + wx
Table 10: Coalitions status changes for country v after a country x exits the EU of
28 and the conditions under which they happen.
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